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Securing and Supporting Research Projects: 
Facilitation Design Patterns
NSF Sponsored Workshop - Educause SPC
Date/Time: Monday, May 13, 2019 from 1:00 – 4:30 p.m.
The ResearchSOC is supported by the National Science 
Foundation under Grant 1840034. The views expressed do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science 
Foundation or any other organization.
Introductions, Logistics and Workshop Purpose
- Prominently place color coded dot on your 
collar
- GOLD if you’re a CISO or other 
executive
- RED if you’re an engineer or analyst of 
any sort
- BLUE if you’re an academic / scientist 
● Cyd Burrows-Schilling, UCSD, Research 
Facilitator
● Vlad Grigorescu, ESnet, Security Engineer
● Todd Stone, IU RSOC
● Michael Corn, UCSD, CISO
● Claire Mizumoto, UCSD Research Facilitator
● Tanya Berger-Wolf, Prof. UIC
● Florence D. Hudson, Founder & CEO at FDHint, LLC
● Mary Conley, Trusted CI
Very quick whip around introductions, 5-10 seconds per person. Name, School, Title, and 
reason for attending.
Ground Rules
● Interrupt any and every time you have a question or comment
○ This is a workshop, not a lecture, your participation is necessary
○ Feel free to disagree!
○ PLEASE share your stories of success or failure
● We’ll have one scheduled break at 2:30 for refreshments, but if we’re on 
schedule we’ll try to squeeze in a couple of 5 minute breaks
● Slides are or will be available
● Don’t forget the post workshop Educause appraisal
● Please feel free to reach out to Cyd or Mike directly with suggestions: this is a 
4 hour version of a 3 day version
Workshop 
Overview
Module 1: Framing and Context
Module 2: Understanding the 
Researcher and Research Program





Research vs. Enterprise Security
Data and Situational complexity
Enterprise vs. Research Security
● At your tables, group together:
● Describe (in columns or a couple of sentences) how Research programs 
differ from Enterprise/administrative activities









● Custom hardware/software lots of 
macgyvering
● Planes, Trains, and Automobiles
● Faculty
● Lab culture





An Example: The Sally Ride
● 40+ vlans
● 3 primary networks (ship, people, 
instruments)
● At sea ~ 275 days/year
● Cocktail straw satellite connection
● “Day mariners” hired in foreign 
ports
● $40,000/day to operate
● Many DoD sponsored projects, CUI 
data
● Connected to port by 10Gbps
We must develop Agility, Flexibility, and understand 
Data Complexity
CISSP model runs smack into the 
research program brick wall
➢Write policy -> inventory 
environment -> impose controls
If we can’t use control frameworks, are we really just 
talking about compensating controls?
Right, but even the term “compensating 
control” is a term of art for security 
professionals, not researchers
Eg, data classifications
● Confidentiality w/out PII
● P-level => specific controls called out in 
standards
● Focused primarily on institution or 
individuals as stakeholders, but where’s 
the science?
Security for Research: a new triad
● Efficient











To Von Welch https://bit.ly/2UPVEfc
?
“Security” must adapt to the structure of science
“The Sunk Cost Fallacy. The Misconception: You make rational decisions based on the future value of objects, investments and 
experiences. The Truth: Your decisions are tainted by the emotional investments you accumulate, and the more you invest in something 





Intro to Sponsored Projects
Facilitation Skills: use cases and 
case study
An Introduction to Sponsored Projects
First…. the Faculty
Then… the Funding Landscape
Acknowledgements: Greg Monaco, Kate Adams, Henry Neeman, Dana 
Brunson, Marcus Bond - content shared with permission
Tenure-Track Faculty at Research Institutions
Incentive Structure:
● Publish papers
● Bring in grant money
● Graduate students
Timeline:
7 years to tenure (typical)  
BUT actually, 6 years (so you can find a job somewhere else if you aren’t 
getting tenure) 
BUT actually, 5 years (year 6 is when your materials are evaluated) 
BUT actually, 4 ½ years (since publishing takes about 6 months)
Typical grants are 3-year and 5-year grants
Funding Agencies
● National Science Foundation (NSF)
● National Institutes of Health (NIH)
● Department of Energy (DOE)
● Department of Defense (DOD)
● United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
● Private Foundations, e.g., Andrew Mellon Foundation
Anatomy of a Proposal
Cover page, Title, PIs/Co-PIs, Project summary: one page
brief project description (executive summary) - explain to reviewers 
and program officer what you plan to do, why it’ll work, and how it’ll 
help.
Project Description: 15 pages on average, intro, usually
3-4 project objectives, intellectual merit, implementation
plan, broader impacts, management plan, evaluating 
progress
Broader Impacts
● Advancement of scientific knowledge
● Activities that contribute to achievement of societally relevant outcomes
● Participation of women, persons w/ disabilities, & underrepresented minorities 
in STEM
● Improved STEM education and educator development at any level
● Increased public scientific literacy and public engagement with science & tech
● Improved well-being of individuals in society
● Development of a diverse, globally competitive STEM workforce
● Increased partnerships between academia, industry, and others
● Improved national security; Increased economic competitiveness of the US
● Enhanced infrastructure for research and education




● Timeline and milestones
● Sustainability plan: What happens when the grant ends?
● Budget: people, things, subcontracts (subject to IDC), participant support
● Budget justification
● Data Management Plan
● Letters of Commitment, letters of collaboration
● Biographical sketches
● Current and Pending Support
● Conflicts of Interest
Probability of Success
National Science Foundation FY2018: 24% Overall
BIO 25%, CSE 23%, EHR 21%, ENG 19%, 
GEO 37%, MPS 29%, SBE 23%
Funding is governed by the Law of Large Numbers:
You have to submit lots of proposals to get any funding 
http://dellweb.bfa.nsf.gov/awdfr3/default.asp
An Introduction to Research Facilitation
Acknowledgements: Claire Mizumoto - content shared with permission
The Research Lifecycle
Introduction to Research Facilitation
The Main Goal: To Move Research Forward
● Researcher-facing professionals contribute to the efforts of the campus:
○ To increase funding opportunities
○ To train researchers to optimize use of tools, software, services, infrastructure
■ > Efficiency
■ > Effectiveness
○ Support collaborative efforts
○ Make way for the next generation
■ As researchers
■ As facilitation professionals
Introduction to Research Facilitation
Skills Needed to be Successful
● Learn to see things from another point of view
○ Researcher
○ Executive / Administration
○ Service Provider
● Speak the same language
● Create a communication conduit
○ Be the translator
○ Be Switzerland
○ Consult, advise
○ Be the matchmaker

Introduction to Research Facilitation
Develop These Skills, Too
● Get researchers as productive as possible, as quickly as possible
● You get one hour with a standard consultation
● Delve into the researcher’s world
○ Go broad, not deep
○ Understand enough to respond with something helpful, to speak intelligently
Develop in-depth, comprehensive knowledge on a wide range of products, 
services, and service providers, and be able to identify appropriate solutions that 
will best meet the needs of the research project.
Introduction to Research Facilitation
Partnering With Facilitators on Your Campus
● Find out where the researcher-facing professionals are are on your campus
○ Often in HPC centers
○ Cyberinfrastructure focus
○ Some campuses now have areas of Research IT
● What type of activities do they provide?
● How can you partner with them?
National Efforts
○ Engaging more higher education and research institutions




● NSF training grant
○ Provide professional skills training to cyber infrastructure (CI) professionals
○ Focus on communication, teamwork, leadership
○ Overarching goal to support interdisciplinary research 
● Collaborators 
○ Tau Beta Pi - Engineering Honor Society 
○ Software / Data Carpentry
○ Campus Champions (XSEDE)
○ CaRCC
○ Blue Waters
○ CIMER and National Research Mentoring Network (NRMN)
○ Research Security Operations Center NSF Grant Number 1840034
















…occurs when information is both shared and understood
…builds trust and fosters relationships
…helps the speaker communicate needs and goals
…helps the listener understand and participate in solutions
Improving Communication Skills
● Communication is a major topic of research
○ Effective communication skills can be taught!
○ There are tools (algorithms) that apply across many scenarios
○ Role playing / rehearsal activities are effective learning tools






Opening an Intake Interview
Hi, my name is Kelly. I need to download and install some export controlled data 
for my research project.  What factors do I need to consider and how do I get 
started? 
What questions do you ask?
Why are Intake Interviews Important?
Good Intake Interviews 
(Research Facilitators)
● Ask about their research
● Take the time that is needed
● Identify the fundamental problem(s) being solved
● Work to describe the problem in terms of security concerns 
● Avoid Jargon
● Ask how they think the problem should be solved
● Assess their ability
● Identify assumptions (yours and theirs)
● Learn to say “No” without saying No
Closing an Intake Interview
● Identify next actions 
● Set a time to complete action items
● Follow up 


































































● The CyberAmbassadors Team: Dirk Colbry, Katy Luchini Colbry, 
Julie Rojewski, Astri Briliyanti and TJ Nguyen
● This material is based upon work supported by the National 
Science Foundation under Grant No. 1730137. Any opinions, 
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the National Science Foundation.
Refreshment Break: 2:30 – 3:00 p.m., Foyer, Second Floor
Facilitation Exercise
● Dr. Tanya Berger-Wolf, Professor, Department of 
Computer Science, University of Illinois at 
Chicago
● Area of study: Flu pandemic, political microtargeting, 
behavioral response to predator presence, species genetic 
diversity. Populations contain intricate connections that 
occur on time scales ranging from milliseconds to 
generations. At the Laboratory for Computational Population 
Biology, we explore the growing interface between 
Population Biology and Computer Science, from genetics to 
social interactions.
Pre-meeting Prep
❏ Google PI - watch any YouTube 
Interviews
❏ Read lab web pages
❏ Contact ORA/G&C for copies of relevant 
grants / contracts
❏ Find out if there’s a data management 
plan on file, or perhaps a technology 
control plan, or an IRB proposal
❏ Talk to unit staff who may or may  not 
support PI and lab
❏ Review recent publications (esp. If they 








This is our interview / facilitation portion with Dr. Berger-Wolf.
Everyone should be prepared to red-flag (er, plate) us. Each table should have a 
note taker, we will report out on Dr. Berger-Wolf’s requirements when finished.




Security tools: programs, templates, 
support
Terms of Art: Securing the Science 
DMZ
Next Steps: building a community 
for support
Toolkits for the Security Professional
Trusted CI:
The NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
Our mission: to provide the NSF community a 
coherent understanding of cybersecurity’s 
role in producing trustworthy science and the 
information and know-how required to 
achieve and maintain effective cybersecurity 
programs.
https://trustedci.org
● Trusted CI engages directly with science and research CI to solve security problems.
● Research CI includes HPC, control systems, one-of-a-kind instruments, highly 
distributed systems, land/air/sea-based systems, extreme environments, etc.
● We produce tools and guidance that open science / CI projects at any scale can use.
○ Cybersecurity Planning Guide
○ Software Engineering Guide
○ Information Security Practice Principles
● We host the NSF Cybersecurity Summit as well as the Large Facilities Cybersecurity 
Team to promote cybersecurity efforts throughout the NSF ecosystem
● Currently in version 1.0
● Short guide for building a cybersecurity 
program for science and CI, plus a wealth 
of templates to jump-start policy creation
● Already in use at Gemini, LSST, and 
other Major Facilities
● Also in use with smaller projects such as 
OSG
● Highly customizable, plug and play just 
the parts your project needs
● https://trustedci.org/guide
Guide to Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Science 
and Engineering Projects (aka Cybersecurity Planning Guide)
Other Useful Items in Cybersecurity Planning Guide 
https://trustedci.org/guide
Templates
Acceptable Use Policy Template
Access Control Policy Template
Asset Management Policy Template
Asset-Specific Access and Privilege Specification 
Template
Disaster Recovery Policy Template
Incident Response Policy and Procedures 
Template
Information Asset Inventory Template
Information Classification Policy Template
Information Security Training and Awareness 
Policy Template
Master Information Security Policy & Procedures 
Template
Password Policy Template





Security Commodity IT in Scientific CI 
Projects: Baseline Controls and Best 
Practices
Trusted CI "Cyber Hygiene" 
Information Security Training Slide 
Deck
Developing Cybersecurity Programs 
For NSF Projects Slide Deck (NSF 
Security Summit 2014)
● Guide to Secure Software Engineering Practice for Science and Scientific 
Cyberinfrastructure
● Short guide for practices that will help achieve security goals of software 
used in science
● Maturity model helps you scale from the needs of small, one-off projects 
to major pieces of infrastructure
● Not a secure coding guide: these are the tools and software development 
processes that make secure coding more likely to succeed in practice
● Written for researchers and programmers
● Currently in draft stages, expected publication June 2019
● https://sweguide.trustedci.org/
Trusted CI Software Engineering Guide 
Addressing Software Development At Any Scale
Level 1:  Intended for one-off, non-network-connected software developed by one or two 
researchers for their own use. Goals: software integrity, scientific reproducibility.
Level 2:  Intended for small software projects that must be used by more than their original 
author(s). Goals: reliable software distribution, software integrity and scientific reproducibility.
Level 3:  Intended for most scientific cyberinfrastructure software. Goals: reasonable 
trustworthiness, maintainability, reliable software distribution, software integrity and scientific 
reproducibility.
Level 4:  Intended for high-reliability scientific cyberinfrastructure software. Goals: security and 
trustworthiness, maintainability, reliable software distribution, software integrity and 
reproducibility.
Level 5:  Intended for critical cyberinfrastructure. Goals: highest levels of security, 
trustworthiness, maintainability, reliable software distribution, software integrity, reproducibility.
The information Security Practice Principles
A risk-based, evidence-based framework
Comprehensivity
● Identify and account for all relevant systems, actors, and risks in the environment
Opportunity
● Take advantage of actor relationships, material resources, and strategic opportunities 
Rigor 
● Specify & enforce expected states, behaviors, & processes governing the relevant systems & actors
Minimization
● Minimize size, quantity, complexity of what is to be protected, & limit externally facing points of attack.
Compartmentation
● Isolate system elements, enable, control interactions strictly necessary for their intended purposes.
Fault tolerance
● Anticipate & address the potential compromise and failure of system elements & security controls.
Proportionality
● Tailor security strategies to the magnitude of the risks, accounting for the practical constraints imposed by 
the mission and the environment.
https://cacr.iu.edu/about/principles.html
















Terms of Art: The Universe of Research Computing
● XSEDE https://www.xsede.org/
● Open Science Grid (OSG) https://opensciencegrid.org/
● PERFSonar https://www.perfsonar.net/
● Globus https://www.globus.org/
● Condo / Hotel Model for Clusters
● Virtual Circuits https://www.internet2.edu/products-services/advanced-networking/layer-2-services/
● HPC vs. HTC
● GPU Cluster
● Data Transfer Node
● The Carpentries https://carpentries.org/ (software, data, and library carpentry workshops)
● Pacific Research Platform (PRP) http://pacificresearchplatform.org/ (and NRP https://bit.ly/2Y7017N) 
● Jupyter Notebooks https://jupyter.org/
● Science DMZ https://fasterdata.es.net/science-dmz/
The Science DMZ: 





● Eli Dart, Science Engagement @ ESnet
● Michael Sinatra, Networking @ ESnet
Tip of the Iceberg
● Some familiarity with Science DMZ as a 
concept
○ Not prescriptive; a design pattern and 
not an architecture
● How to design the Science DMZ to 
strengthen your security posture
● Provide you with resources
○ https://fasterdata.es.net
How is Data Being Transferred?
● A small number of (very) large flows
○ 10 Gigabit minimum, 100 and 400 Gigabit in production, 1 Terabit in planning stages
● GridFTP is the de-facto standard
“GridFTP is a high-performance, secure, reliable data transfer protocol optimized for high-bandwidth 
wide-area networks. The GridFTP protocol is based on FTP, the highly-popular Internet file transfer 
protocol.”
● Focus on “data transfer nodes” (DTNs)
○ Systems designed from the ground up for lightning-fast disk-to-network transfers
○ https://fasterdata.es.net/science-dmz/DTN/







With loss, high performance  
beyond metro distances is 
essentially impossible
Putting a Solution Together
● Effective support for TCP-based data transfer
○ Design for correct, consistent, high-performance operation
○ Design for ease of troubleshooting
● Easy adoption is critical
○ Large laboratories and universities have extensive IT deployments
○ Drastic change is prohibitively difficult
● Cybersecurity – defensible without compromising performance
Science DMZ Security Myth
● The big myth: The main goal of the Science DMZ is to avoid firewalls and other 
security controls.
○ Leads to all sorts of odd (and wrong) claims like:
■ “Our whole backbone is a Science DMZ because there is no firewall in front of the backbone.”
■ “The Science DMZ doesn’t allow for any security controls.”
■ “The Science DMZ requires a default-permit policy.”
● The reality: The Science DMZ emphasizes reducing degrees-of-freedom, 
reducing the number of network devices (including middleboxes) in the path, 
eliminating devices that can’t perform, and ensuring that the devices that remain 
in the path are capable of large-scale data-transfer caliber performance.
From Myth to Reality
●Contrary to myth, the Science DMZ is a security architecture.
●The Science DMZ is a form of security control, not something to be controlled.
●At the same time, the Science DMZ enables us to do a better job of risk-based 
security through segmentation.
● Borrow ideas from traditional network security (Traditional DMZ)
○ Separate enclave at network perimeter (“Demilitarized Zone”)
○ Specific location for external-facing services
○ Clean separation from internal network
○ Do the same thing for science – Science DMZ
How Do Firewall Appliances Work?
What is a Firewall?
Vendor Answer
● Specific appliance, with “Firewall” printed on the side
● Lots of protocol awareness, intelligence
● Application awareness
● User awareness (VPN, specific access controls, etc.)
● Designed for large concurrent user count, low per-user bandwidth (enterprise 
traffic)
What is a Firewall?
Security Group Answer
● “Firewall” appliance, purchased from the commercial marketplace
● The place in the network where security policy gets applied
● Owned by the security group, not by the networking group
● Primary risk mitigation mechanism
What is a Firewall?
NIST Answer (Publication 800-41 rev. 1, Sep. 2009)
“Firewalls are devices or programs that control the flow of network traffic 
between networks or hosts that employ differing security postures”
Problems with Firewall Appliances
● Firewalls have a lot of sophistication in an enterprise setting
○ Application layer protocol analysis (HTTP, POP, MSRPC, etc.)
○ Built-in VPN servers
○ User awareness
● Data-intensive science flows don’t match this profile
○ Common case – data on filesystem A needs to be on filesystem Z
■ Data transfer tool verifies credentials over an encrypted channel
■ Then open a socket or set of sockets, and send data until done (1TB, 10TB, 100TB, …)
○ One workflow can use 10% to 50% or more of a 10G network link
● Do we have to use a firewall?
Firewalls as Access Lists
● What does a firewall admin ask for when asked to allow data 
transfers?
○ IP address of your host
○ IP address of the remote host
○ Port range
○ That looks like an ACL to me – I can do that on the router
● No special config for advanced protocol analysis – just address/port
Security Without Enterprise Firewalls
● Data intensive science traffic interacts poorly with enterprise firewalls
● Does this mean we ignore security?  NO!
○ We must protect our systems
○ We need to find a way to do security that does not prevent us from getting the science done
● Key point – security policies and mechanisms that protect the 
Science DMZ should be implemented so that they do not 
compromise performance
New and Emerging Firewall Designs
● Several organizations are working on ways to make firewalls better
● Some use SDN to dynamically switch approved flows around the firewall
● Some allow the firewall to control a switch directly
● Some vendors are now building firewalls to accommodate elephant flows
● ESnet hasn’t directly tested these approaches, though they look promising
● Some have significant cost
Science DMZ Example 1
Science DMZ Example 2: Multiple Projects
Other Security Mechanisms: ACLs and Applications
● Aggressive access lists
○ More useful with project-specific DTNs
○ Exchanging data with a small set of remote collaborators = ACL is fairly easy to manage
○ Large-scale data distribution servers = difficult/time consuming to handle (but then, the firewall 
ruleset for such a service would be, too)
● Limitation of the application set
○ Makes it easier to protect
○ Keep unnecessary applications off the DTN (and watch for them anyway using a host IDS – take 
violations seriously)
Other Security Mechanisms: Network Monitor
● Network Security Monitors
○ One example is Bro – https://bro.org/
○ Bro is high-performance and battle-tested
■ Bro protects several high-performance national assets
■ Bro can be scaled with clustering: https://docs.zeek.org/en/stable/cluster/
○ Other IDS/NSM solutions also available
Other Security Mechanisms: Host IDS
● Using a Host IDS is recommended for hosts in a Science DMZ
● Several open source solutions exist:
• OSSec: http://www.ossec.net/
• Rkhunter: http://rkhunter.sourceforge.net (rootkit detection + FIM)
• chkrootkit: http://chkrootkit.org/
• Logcheck: http://logcheck.org (log monitoring)
• Fail2ban: http://www.fail2ban.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page
• denyhosts: http://denyhosts.sourceforge.net/
Collaboration Within the Organization
● All stakeholders should collaborate on Science DMZ design, policy, and 
enforcement
● The security people have to be on board
○ Political cover for security officers
○ If the deployment of a Science DMZ is going to jeopardize the job of the security officer, expect 
pushback
● The Science DMZ is a strategic asset, and should be understood by the 
strategic thinkers in the organization
○ Changes in security models
○ Changes in operational models
○ Enhanced ability to compete for funding
○ Increased institutional capability – greater science output
Conclusions and Implications
● Think about what the Science DMZ is trying to do.
○ Improve performance, both by removing impediments and improving the performance of the devices 
that must be in line
○ Apply security policies appropriate for the data and the applications being protected
○ Ease troubleshooting
○ In general, reduce degrees of freedom from science networks to increase security flexibility/options
○ Maximize performance and security and resiliency
Warning: If You Build It...
● One thing that often happens is that an early power user of the Science DMZ is 
the network engineering group that builds it
○ Service prototyping
○ Deployment of test applications for other user groups to demonstrate value
● The production Science DMZ is just that – production
○ Once users are on it, you can’t take it down to try something new
○ Stuff that works tends to attract workload
● Take-home message: plan for multiple Science DMZs from the beginning –
at the very least you’re going to need one for yourself
Supporting Each Other: building a community of 
practice
The Research Security Operations Center (ResearchSOC) has partnered with Ask.CI, the Q & A and 
discussion platform for all things cyberinfrastructure (CI), to create a new community and learning platform 
for those working to secure cyberinfrastructure crucial to open science.
To Join:
Create an account via Ask.CI: https://ask.cyberinfrastructure.org/
Find this group here:  https://ask.cyberinfrastructure.org/c/rsoc
The community offers discussion, Zoom-based live learning opportunities, networking, and more. Your 
contributions will ensure that this becomes an active, informative community!




● Dirk Colbry Michigan State University colbrydi@msu.edu
● Florence D. Hudson CACR & FDHint 
● Tanya Berger-Wolf, University of Illinois, Chicago
● Claire Mizumoto, UC San Diego
● Mary Conley & Todd Stone CACR/Trusted CI
● Von Welch, CACR/Trusted CI/ResearchSOC vwelch@iu.edu
